Defeasible Decisions: What the Proposal is and isn't by Loui, Ronald P.
Defeasible Decisions: What the Proposal Is and Isn't 
R. P. Loui 
Dept. of Computer Science and 
Dept. of Philosophy 
Washington University 
St. Louis, MO 63130 
loui @ai. wustl.edu 
Abstract 
In two recent papers, I have proposed a description of 
decision analysis that differs from the Bayesian picture 
painted by Savage, Jeffrey and other classic authors. 
Response to this view has been either overly enthusi­
astic or unduly pessimistic. In this paper I try to place 
the idea in its proper place, which must be somewhere 
in between. 
Looking at decision analysis as defeasible reasoning 
produces a framework in which planning and decision 
theory can be integrated, but work on the details has 
barely begun. It also produces a framework in which 
the meta-decision regress can be stopped in a reason­
able way, but it does not allow us to ignore meta-level 
decisions. The heuristics for producing arguments that 
I have presented are only supposed to be suggestive; 
but they are not open to the egregious errors about 
which some have worried. And though the idea is fa­
miliar to those who have studied heuristic search, it 
is somewhat richer because the control of dialectic is 
more interesting than the deepening of search. 
1 What the Proposal Is. 
"Defeasible Specification of Utilities" [Loui89a] and 
"Two Heuristic Functions for Decision" [Loui89b] pro­
posed that decision analysis could profitably be con­
ceived as defeasible reasoning. Analyzing a decision in 
one decision tree or model is an argument for doing a 
particular act. The result of analysis with a different 
tree of model is another argument. That there can be 
multiple arguments suggests that there can be better 
arguments and lesser arguments. Thus, arguments for 
decisions must be defeasible. 
Response to this idea has been mixed, but often im­
moderate. This paper attempts to temper the reaction 
by saying what the proposal is and isn't. 
1.1 Like Qualitative, Defeasible, 
Practical Reasoning. 
The proposed defeasible reasoning about decisions is 
the natural extension of philosophers' defeasible prac­
tical reasoning about action. The difference is that our 
arguments for actions are quantitative, often invoking 
expected utility calculations. 
In practical reasoning, reasoning about action is qual­
itative. If an act achieves a goal, that's a reason for 
performing that act. If an act achieves a goal but also 
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invokes a penalty, and that penalty is more undesir­
able than the goal is desirable, that may be reason not 
to perform the act. Eveyone assumes that practical 
reasoning is defeasible in this way: that is, an argu­
ment for an action can be defeated by taking more 
into account in its deliberation. But this had never 
been formalized as defeasible reasoning, to my knowl­
edge, because formalisms for defeasible reasoning are 
relatively new. 
Now that we have such formalisms, we can write the 
general schemata for practical reasoning quite simply: 
(a)(d). fa ACHIEVES d A d IS-DESl >-- foo al, 
(a)(d). fa ACHIEVES d A d  IS-UNDESl >--
f-,(ooa)l, 
where " >-- " is a relation between sentences that 
corresponds roughly to our intuitive relation "is a 
reason for"; ( z) is a meta-language quantifier. Ax­
ioms that govern such a relation are described in 
[Loui87,88b] and [Simari89a]. They are similar to ax­
ioms given by other authors ([Geffner88,89], [Nute89J, 
[Delgrande87]). 
Reasons can be composed to form arguments. So prior 
to considering interference among contemplated ac­
tions, we might produce the argument: 
"a1 ACHIEVES d1 A d1 IS-DES11 >-- "oo a1" 
"a2 ACHU!)VES d2 A d2 IS-DES11 >- "oo a2" 
"oo a1 A oo a2" >- "oo a1 & a2''. 
But there may be other arguments that disagree with 
this argument, such as 
"a1 & a2 ACHIEVES d3 A d3 IS-UNDES11 >-
"...,(oo a1 & a2)". 
In fact, we should be able to write our reasons in such a 
way that preference among arguments can be achieved 
with the specificity defeaters in defeasible inference, 
i.e., those rules that tell us to prefer one argument 
over another if it uses more information. 
Suppose I am reasoning about whether to rent an Alfa, 
though it incurs a. big expense. An argument for rent­
ing an Alfa is based on the following reason: 
"rent-the-Alfa ACHIEVES drove-Alja /\ drove­
Alia IS-DEs" >- "oo rent-the-Alfa". 
A different argument which comes into conflict is based 
on the reason: 
"rent-the-Alfa ACHIEVPlS incurred-big-ezpense A 
incurred-big-ezpense IS-UNDEs" >-
"...,(oo rent-the-Alja)". 
There is no reason to choose among these arguments, 
so they interfere and neither justifies its conclusion. 
Suppose further that taking into account the desir­
ability of driving the Alfa and the undesirability of 
incurring big expense, I judge the combination to be 
undesirable. 
"drove-Alf a IS·DI!Is A incurred-
big-expen6e Is.uNnas" >-- "(drove-Alfa & 
incurred-big-expense) Is- UND&s". 
Then there is a third argument, based on the combined 
reasons: 
"drove-Alfa IS-Das A incurred-
big-expense rs-uNnas" >-- "(drove-Alfa & 
incurred-big-expense) Is-uNnBs" 
"rent-the-Alfa ACHII!IV!Is (drove-Alfa & incurred­
big-e:cpen6e) 1\ (drove-Alfa & incurred-big­
e:cpense) rS-UNDss" >-- "...,(no rent-the-
Alfa)". 
This argument disagrees with the first argument, 
which was in favor of renting the Alfa. But it takes into 
account all of the information that the first argument 
takes into account, and it does so in a way that can­
not be counter-argued. So it is a superior argument; 
it defeats the first argument. 
All of this reasoning about action is defeasible. There 
may be other arguments, based on what else we notice 
that renting the Alfa achieves, and what we may know 
about their desirability in various contexts. As more 
consequences of action are inferred, more arguments 
can be presented. Eventually, defeat relations among 
those arguments are proved. At any time, based on 
the pattern of defeat relations among presented argu­
ments, there is either an undefeated justification for 
taking a particular action, or there are interfering ar­
guments whose conflict has not been resolved. In the 
latter case, we might fall back on our un-tutored in­
clination (e.g., to rent the Alfa). Sometimes we act 
for reasons; sometimes we act for very good reasons; 
sometimes we do not have the luxury of having unan­
imous reasons, or any reasons at all. 
Of course, this qualitative practical reasoning is a very 
weak way of analyzing tradeoff's. It does not take into 
account known risks of actions, that is, known proba­
bilities of acts achieving various effects. 
1.2 But Quantitative and 
Risk-Sensitive. 
What I have proposed is a quantitative version of this 
defeasible reasoning about decisions. An act achieves 
an effect with known probability, and we have inde­
pendent reasons for the utilities of each of the result­
ing states. By weighing these independent utilities by 
their respective probabilities, we produce an argument 
for the utility of the act. With different independent 
reasons for the utilities of resulting states, we get dif­
ferent arguments. With different accounting of the 
possible results of an act, again, we produce different 
arguments. If we are clever, reasons can be written in 
an existing formalism for defeasible reasoning in such 
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a way that those arguments that justify their conclu­
sions are exactly those arguments that we would con­
sider compelling among the multitude of potentially 
conflicting arguments. 
Suppose I consider the possibility that my department 
will reimburse me for renting the Alfa, and calculate 
its probability to be 0.4. Based on expense and access 
to the Alfa, I assess the utilities of the various resulting 
states and calculate an expected utility for renting the 
Alfa. If it is greater than the utility of renting the 
econo-car, it represents an argument for renting the 
Alfa. 
u( dept-pays; rent-the-Al fa BASED-ON expense; 
whether-drove-Alfa) = 10 utils 
u( -,dept-pays; rent-the-Alf a BASI!ID-oN expense; 
whether-drove-Alfa) = -1 utils 
Expected u(rent-the-Alfa BASED·ON expense; 
whether-drove-Al fa; whether-dept-pays) 
3.4 utils 
u( rent-econo-car) = 2 utils 
therefore, defeasibly, rent-the-Alf a. 
But if instead I consider expense, access to the Alfa, 
and the dissatisfaction of my department chairman, in 
the assessment of utilities, then I produce a different 
argument. 
u(dept-pays; rent-the-Alfa BASED-ON expense; 
whether-drove-All a; how-chairman-reacts) 
= 8 utils 
u( -,dept-pay6; rent-the-Alfa BASED· ON expen6e; 
whether-drove-Al fa; how-chairman-reacts) 
= -4 utils 
Expected u(rent-the-Alfa BASED-ON expense; 
whether-drove-A/fa; how-chairman-reacts; 
whether-dept-pays) = 0.8 utils 
u(rent-econo-car) = 2 utils 
therefore, defeasibly, rent-econo-car. 
As before, there may be other arguments, based on 
other contingencies to be analyzed ( e.g., whether I can 
fool the accounting secretary,  whether it rains, etc. ) 
and other factors that affect the independent reasons 
for valuing various states of the world (e.g., how my 
colleagues react, how my friends react, etc. ) . Nor­
mally, in decision analy sis we require all such reasons 
to be taken into account in advance. For computa­
tional and foundational reasons, this is not so here. 
One way this reasoning can be formalized is with the 
following axiom schemata, which presume as default 
that there is a linear-additive structure to utility when 
exceptions are not known. 
Properties, such as P and Q, make basic contribu­
tions to the utility of a state in which they are known 
to hold. If the contribution of P is x and the contri­
bution of Q is y, that provides a reason for taking the 
contribution of the conjunction to be the sum of x and 
y. 
Ax.l. (:c)(y)(P)(Q). rcontr(P) = :c & contr(Q) 
= 
yl >-- rcontr(P & Q) = :c + yl. 
. ' 
This is defeated if we know independently the contri­
bution of P & Q to be something other than the sum 
of the individual contributions. 
"contr" maps properties to utility contributions. Any 
information about this mapping, together with the 
knowledge that property P holds in state 6, provides a 
reason for taking the utility of s to be the contribution 
of P. If P & Q is known to hold in 6, then taking u(s) 
to be the contribution of P & Q will result in a better 
argument for what is the utility of&. 
Ax.2. (P)(8). IT(P, s)l >- ru(8) = contr(P)l. 
Here, T(P, s) says that P holds in 6. 
Finally, if event E is known to have probability k in 
sta.te s, then this provides a reason for taking the util­
ity of 8 to be the weighted sum of the children's utili­
ties. 
Ax.3. (E)(8)(k). rT(prob(E) = k, s)l � lu(&) 
= u(<E; s>)k + u(<-.E; s>){l- k)l. 
1.3 Better Detailed Than Some Have 
Thought. 
Ax.l has been criticized on two counts: first, 
for permitting a utility pump (anonymous referee), 
and second, for assuming independence of contribu­
tions([Thomason89l). The first criticism is wrong if 
we add the obvious requirement that 
Ax.i. (P)(Q) \- r(P ::::: Q) :,) contr(P) := 
contr(Q)l. 
Then contr(P1) = 10 does not provide reason for 
contr(P1 & P!) == 20; the axioms governing the con­
struction of arguments require that they be consistent. 
The second criticism is right, but empty: indeed, we 
assume independence of contributions. But that is a 
defeasible assumption, and when it is an incorrect as­
sumption, we expect that it is made known as an ex­
plicit exception. The properties does-&moke and has­
cancer typically co-occur. The individual contribution 
of does-smoke in a state might be -20, and the indi­
vidual contribution of has-cancer in a state might be 
- 50 , but the joint contribution of does-smoke and has­
cancer might be an exception to additivity, -60. This 
exception must be stated explicitly. 
Figures 1 through 5 show some arguments for utility 
valuations, and interations. In each case, the utility of 
state 8 is at issue. Here I am assuming Simari's system 
[Simari89a.J . 
Figure 1 shows the most basic argument for the utility 
of s based on the contribution of P, which holds in 
s. The conclusion, u(s) =:: 5, is based on the theory 
below it. It rides over a bold horizontal line whenever 
it is justified. The theory consists of a set of defeasible 
rules, which are depicted as connected digraphs (the 
convention here is that arrows always go up) . Sources 
must be given as evidence. Contingent sentences used 
in these graphs are underlined and are important in de­
termining specificity of various arguments. sentences 
below the vertical line are setences given as evidence 
that are used to produce the conclusion, but not to 
activate any defeasible rules. 
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Figure 2 shows a similar argument, where two defeasi­
ble rules are used instead of one. Multiple in-direceted 
edges are understood as representing conjunction. 
Figure 3 shows two arguments that conflict. W hen 
there is defeat of one argument by another, the defeat­
ing argument has a large arrowhead. The defeating 
argument here is the most basic argument that uses 
the expected utility axiom {Ax. 3). Defeat is clear to 
see here because 
T(P & R, E \&) & T(P & R, E \&) � 
T(P, s). 
Figure 4 shows conflict among two arguments that de­
termine the contributions of properties through defea­
sible arguments. 
Figure 5 shows an argument that uses both expected 
utility and defeasible reasoning about the contribu­
tions of properties. Since the contingent sentences are 
those underlined, specificity holds. Note that if the 
sentences concerning contr had been regarded as con­
tingent, there would not have been specificity. 
1.4 One Way To Integrate Planning 
and Decision Theory. 
The original motivation for the use of non-monotonic 
language was to find a concise specification of utility 
functions mapping descriptions of the world into the 
rea.ls, when descriptions are collections of sentences in 
a. first order predicate logical language. There is no 
way for planning research to exploit the existing ideas 
for decision-making under known risk if there is no 
practical way to represent the relative desirability of 
descriptions of the world. 
Concise representation is not trivial. If there are 2n 
logicaly independent atomic formulae that contribute 
to the valuation of states, then there are 2" sentences 
in the Lindenbaum-Ta.rski algebra of atomic sentences. 
Descriptions of the world number 3n if we allow only 
conjunction of atomic formulae, or 2(2") if we allow 
arbitrary disjunction. A brute force method would 
have us specify the utilities of each of the 2", at the 
very least. 
Decision theory avoids the burden of this specification 
by presuming that the world has only a small num­
ber of relevant properties, expressed by propositions or 
atomic formulae. It is significant that Jeffrey's Logic 
of Decision [Jeffrey65] never explicitly considers alge­
bras larger than 210; even then, it is considered in a 
case in which there is indifference among all of the 
descriptions. 
Planning avoids the burden of specification by making 
no graded distinctions among descriptions. Descrip­
tions of the world either satisfy all of the goals or they 
do not. In this case, there is a short description of the 
utility mapping, on the order of the number of goals, 
and independent of the size of the descriptions. 
When utilities are real-valued, instead of 0- 1, there 
may still be concise descriptions of the utility map­
ping. We presume that there is a way to construct 
utilities of states from the structure of their descrip-
tions. That is, there a.re regularities in the utility map­
ping that can be expressed in a small number of rules, 
and possibly some exceptions to those rules. One kind 
of regularity that can be exploited is separability of the 
contributions of various parts of the description. The 
natural way to partition a description is by its atomic 
sentences. This is the regularity that axiom Ax.l rep­
resents: a linear-additive separability reminiscent of 
multi-attribute decompositions of utility. 
Now we can pose decision-problems on worlds whose 
descriptions are as complicated as they are in planning 
problems. 
There is plenty of work to be done here. The next 
question to be studied is how to interpret the planning 
ideas of goal-directed search. In our present represen­
tation of utility, there is no clear line between goals 
and non-goals. There are sentences that contribute 
heavily to the utility of a world's description, and sen­
tences that are relatively inconsequential, all things 
being equal. This can depend on context, on what 
else is contained in the description. It is unclear how 
to intepret goal-directed chaining not only because of 
the conception of goals, but also because of the nature 
of chaining. Since the world of decision-making under 
risk is not deterministic, chaining may have to dis­
tinguish events that are and are not under the direct 
control of the agent. 
One possible use of planning's backward-chaining from 
goals in the current framework is as follows. Suppose 
on the confrontation of a decision problem that there is 
some way of identifying a small number of saliently de­
sirable and undesirable states. For the moment, treat 
all events as controllable, i.e., as if they could be cho­
sen, even if they have a low probability of occurring. 
Now backward chain to identify some of the sequences 
of acts and events that lead to these salient states. 
These are not exhaustive. They do not represent the 
likely outcomes of sequences of actions. But they are 
starting points for constructing arguments. 
Consider each path. Arguments are constructed for 
the value of the path's probability and the value of 
the terminal state's utility. These become subargu­
ments for the argument to take (or avoid) the actions 
contained in the path. Each path defines a decision 
tree exaggerated in depth and narrowness. Of course, 
there will be disagreements: some lines of envision­
ment correspond to optimism, some to pessimism. It 
is a simple matter to combine the trees into a single 
argument to resolve the disagreements. The result is 
a fairly bushy decision tree. A good argument should 
also consider what states are achieved with the bulk 
of the probability. 
This is just one interpretation of existing AI planning 
practice on the sequencing of actions. There may be 
others to be investigated. 
1.5 One Way to Avoid Small Worlds. 
The use of defeasible reasoning is intended to avoid 
the problem of small worlds (see also [Edwards89] 
and [D'Ambrosio&Fehling89]). Savage worried briefly 
about how much detail there ought to be in decision 
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models. There are limitations on what we can explic­
itly consider in models. Could it be that taking more 
into account explicitly can alter the choice of act? On 
Savage's v iew, this is impossible. On my view 1 it is a 
fact of life. Savage's solution was to retreat to an ideal 
in which all considerations not explicit are implicit; 
revealing them cannot alter the decision. My solution 
is to accept non-monotonicity in deliberation, and ac­
cept that the model can be improved. The answer is 
not to suppose that all small worlds are as good as 
big worlds, but to posit that the smaller worlds can be 
avoided by enlarging worlds over time. 
This opens my delibera.tors to hypothetical dutch 
books. An agent could commit to an act, and it could 
be the case that further deliberation would have rec­
ommended an act incompatible with the first: incom­
patible in the sense that both acts taken simultane­
ously would guarantee loss of money, if not of utility. 
But as has been known for years now, such hypothet­
ical dutch books are inocuous. No one would take the 
second action after committing to implement the first 
as well [Kyburg78]. In fact, our model of deliberation 
does not even include simultaneous acts. 
1.6 One Way to Avoid Computing 
Relevance. 
The problem of small worlds is one problem for 
resource-limited rational reasoners. The proposed 
view of decision-making copes with two other noto­
rious problems of limited rationality. It is worth con­
sidering the ways in which it copes. 
Spectators of AI in psychology and philosophy 
(Pylyshyn87] have discussed two related problems: 
first, how to compute what is relevant without looking 
at the irrelevant, i.e., how to know which stones not 
to turn without turning them; second, how to think 
that enough thinking has been done, so that it is time 
to act. Some ha.ve misinterpreted these as the frame 
problem, but they are better called the problem of 
turning stones, and Hamlet's problem, respectively. 
Both problems involve a regress. In the case of Ham­
let's problem, the regress is that meta-reasoning seems 
required optimally to stop the reasoning, and meta­
meta-reasoning is required optimally to stop the meta­
reasoning, and so on. This proposal avoids the regress 
by accepting sub-optimality at the highest level, or 
better 1 by questioning the notion of optimality in in­
finitely extendable analyses. We do not preclude meta­
reasoning (as below in section 2) but also do not re­
quire it. 
It is less important for the model to be optimal at a 
given instant when it will be altered immediately in the 
next instant. Models can still be good or bad, wonder­
ful or awful, and meta-reasoning may be required to 
choose one over the other, and meta-meta-reasoning 
to improve the choice. But at some level, one has to 
take one's chances. 
In the case of turning stones, the regress is one of 
deciding what is relevant to a. problem, which might 
require looking at irrelevant aspects· of the problem. 
Moreover, the decision procedure itself might be irrel­
evant. This proposal avoids the regress by not requir­
ing that it get started. Most aspects of the problem 
that are irrelevant do not find their way into the anal­
ysis. By hypothesis, many relevant aspects also do 
not find their way into the analysis, because delib­
eration time expires: an argument is discovered that 
establishes that an act should be performed now. Con­
versely, some irrelevancies actually do find their way 
into the analysis. Good search and chaining strategies 
avoid irrelevancies. Good control strategies avoid pre­
maturity of action or hopeless postponement of action. 
Distinguishing good and bad strategies is a computa­
tion taken off-line. 
2 What the Proposal Isn't. 
Some have thought the proposal to be something that 
it is not. 
2.1 Just Game Tree Search. 
The proposal is a lot like the proposal to do heuristic 
search on a game tree. It is true that the idea will 
be unsurprising to those who have studied heuristic 
search [Pearl88, Hansson&Mayer89). Apparently, all 
one does is substitute expected utility for the mini­
max criterion. The proposal differs in more substan­
tive ways, however. 
The obvious difference is that there are two ways to 
supercede a heuristic evaluation of a node here. One 
way is to deepen the analysis and use the children's 
expected utility for the heuristic evaluation. Another 
way is simply to involve more properties that hold at 
that node in the heuristic evaluation. 
There is a sense in which taking a node's children into 
account just is taking more of its properties into ac­
count. Looked at that way, there is only one way to 
improve a heuristic evaluation, namely, to take more 
properties into account. Still, on this view, this is a 
generalization of heuristic search, where heuristic eval­
uation is improved in a computation only by deepen­
ing. 
The more important difference from game tree search 
is less obvious. It has to do with the aggregation of ar­
guments and defeat relations among them, to produce 
justification for an action. The dialectic of argument, 
counter-argument, defeat, and reinstatement is more 
complex than the simple deepening of heuristic search. 
Consider a situation where there is an argument to do 
a particular act, and a disagreeing argument, which 
says to do a different act. There is a third argument, 
too, which counterargue& and defeats the second ar­
gument, thereby reinstating the first argument. These 
are shown in figure 6 and recounted below: 
Argument 1: 
T(P, at) >-- u(a1) = contr(P) 
T(Q, a2) >- u(a2) = contr(Q) 
contr(P) = 3 
contr(Q) = 1 
u(a1) > u(a2) >- oo(a1) 
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This is an argument to do a1 based on a comparison 
with a2. 
Argument 2: 
T(P, al) >- u(al) = contr(P) 
T{R, a3) >- u{a3) = contr(R) 
contr(P) = 3 
contr(Q) = 5 
u(al) < u(a3) >-- --.(oo(al)). 
This is an argument that disagrees with the first ar­
gument. 
Argument 3: 
T(R & S, a3) >-- u(a3) = contr(R & S) 
contr(R & S) = 2. 
This argument counterargues argument 2 at the point 
where argument 2 contends that u(a3) == 5. It does 
not augment argument 1 in any way, but it defeats 
argument 2, thus reinstating argument 1. 
The third argument could conceivably be integrated 
into the first argument to produce a more comprehen­
sive argument: an argument that defeats the second 
argument by itself. But that would be somewhat com­
plex and is not required in the presence of the second 
argument's rebuttal. W hy build into an argument a 
defense to every possible objection, when each objec­
tion can be rebutted as it arises? 
I do not think there are game tree search situations 
that correspond to this state of defeasible deliberation 
on decision. 
2.2 Excluding Meta-Level Analysis. 
Prominent work on limited rationality is being done on 
decision-theoretic meta-reasoning (esp. (Horvitz88], 
[Russell and Wefald89), [Etzioni89]). This proposal 
seems to conflict with their approaches because it does 
not require meta-reasoning. But it does not preclude 
meta-reasoning, and sometimes such reasoning is use­
ful. I do not have notation for representing nor ax­
iom schemata for generating reasons and arguments 
of the following kind, but conceivably they could be 
produced. The first have to do with meta-reasoning 
that controls the attention at the object level: 
or 
( a1 > a2 in M1) 1\ ( M1 is not worth expanding) is 
reason to do a1 now 
(al >- a2 in Ml) 1\ (do-now(al) >- expand(Ml) ) 
>- do-now(al). 
These would be reasons that say that there is no net 
perceived value of expanding the model. As the cited 
authors have pointed out, the preference to expand a 
model may be based on an expected utility computa­
tion. I would add that computation of such a utility 
will be defeasible: 
u(do-now(at)) = 15 1\ u(e:z:pand(M1)) = 10 
f---- do-now(a1) >- e:r;pand(Ml) 
T( intended-act-
succeeds, do-now( a1)) 1\ contr( intended-act­
succeeds) = 15 >-- u(do-now(a1)) = 15 
T(prob(find-better-act) = .3, e�pand(Ml)), etc. 
As an aside, my discussions have not been about ar­
guments for acting "now" as oppsed to acting "later." 
I have presumed that time simply expires, leaving an 
apparent best act at the moment. To produce argu­
ments for action "now" would seem to re-open Ham­
let's problem: given such an argument to act "now," 
do we take the time to seek a counter-argument? 
The second kind of meta-reasoning has to do with ar­
bitrating among disagreeing arguments at the object 
level, when no defeat relation is known to hold: 
(al >- a2 in Argl A 
a2 >- a1 in Arg2 A 
Argl is based on short-term-considerations A 
Arg2 IS based on long-term-considerations) 
>- a1 >- a2 
So I do not see meta-reasoning as incompatible with 
this proposal. We have so little experience with mech­
anizing simple arguments at the object level, however, 
that the focus of attention remains there. 
2.3 One Particular Heuristic 
Function. 
This proposal does not live or die with the multi­
attribute suggestion for representing utility concisely. 
A second heuristic is exhibited in [Loui89b] based on 
[Schubert88] . In order to have utility expectations, all 
that is needed is some representation of utility on sen­
tential descriptions of the world. Practical necessity 
demands that there be some regularity that can be 
exploited for compact representation. 
In order to achieve defeasibility in our deliberation 
about decisions, all that are needed are independent 
reasons for valuing a state based on lists of proper­
ties that can be proved to hold in that state. Those 
lists of properties are not complete, and reasons for 
valuations based on incomplete properties need not 
bear relation to valuations based on probabilities of 
the omitted properties. 
In fact, I expect that heuristics for utility will vary 
from individual to individual, and will depend on ap­
plication. 
2.4 Terrible Computation. 
A valid concern [Pearl89] is that I am substituting 
something whose effective computation is well under­
stood (heuristic search) with something whose effec­
tive computation has yet to be achieved (a variety of 
non-monotonic reasoning). This is true to the extent 
that deliberation on decision is just heuristic search, 
and special cases of defeasible reasoning do not yield 
to special purpose, effective inference procedures. If 
the only dialectic envisioned is the succession of ar­
guments based on successively deepened trees, all of 
which defeat their predecessors, then this defeasible 
reasoning is analogous to heuristic search. And it can 
be implemented without much ado. But defeasible 
reasoning about decision can be more interesting than 
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that. Until we discover patterns of dialectic for deci­
sion that lead to special algorithms, we are stuck with 
the general framework for defeasible reasoning. This 
situation is not so bad: dialectic in defeasible reason­
ing has good prospects for being controlled reasonably 
well under resource limitation. 
2.5 Necessarily Quantitative. 
Reasons need not be quantitative. Consider 
or 
a1 is better than the usual risk is reason to do a1 
a1 achieves my aspirations in this context is reason 
to do a1. 
Qualitative reasons make especially good sense at the 
meta-level: 
(the difference between a1 and a2 is small) and (a1 
is robust) is reason to do a1. 
A reason suggested by Doyle as a tie-breaker is: 
can't choose between a1 and a2 is reason to do a1. 
Again, I have no schemata for generating these kinds 
of reasons, and no way to weigh arguments based on 
these reasons against arguments based on quantitative 
considerations. But I believe that a full theory of de­
liberation would include them, or be able to reduce 
them to quantitative reasons. 
2.6 Complete. 
Finally, it should be admitted clearly that this pro­
posal is not complete. The integration of planning 
techniques, the exploration of meta-reasoning and 
qualitative reasons, the production of reasons for act­
ing now, control of search and dialectic, and experience 
with particular heuristics are all things to be done. All 
we can do at present is produce expected utility ar­
guments at various levels of detail. We do, however, 
have a PRO LOG-based implementation of the under­
lying defeasible reasoning system [Simari89b] and see 
no major obstacle in using the schemata Ax.l - Ax.3 
with some help unifying terms within functions. 
3 An Open Conversation with 
Raiffa. 
There is a. device through which to take the measure 
of this proposal's break from Bayesian tradition, and 
at the same time to see the inutitiveness of what is 
being proposed. Consider the following hypothetical 
conversation with the great decision theorist, Howard 
Raiffa. I phone him at his Harvard office to solicit his 
best decision analysis under resource limitation. 
Ron: I'm at the San Francisco airport. I have this 
decision problem - whether to rent an 
Alfa. Can you help? 
Raiffa: Sure. I have this theory, you know. What 
are all the relevant distinctions among 
states? All the effects of events? All the 
available courses of action? 
. ' 
Ron: You want me to list them all? I don't have 
time! Am I paying for this phone call? 
Raiffa: Yes, I see. Hmm. Ok. Confine your atten­
tion to the important ones. 
Ron: How important? 
At this point, there are two good responses. 
Raiffa. 1: Well , let's make a model of the expected 
utility of omitting various considerations. 
Raiffa 2: Well, let's just start and see what comes 
to mind and refine the model later. 
The Bayesians want to think that the first answer is 
the only legitimate one. Meanwhile, it is the second 
answer that makes sense to us. What is the logic of 
decision analysis based on this second answer? This is 
the question that I have been attempting to answer. 
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